In recent years, choice and autonomy have been prioritized as key quality indicators in palliative care services. This article examines current palliative care discourses with respect to patient choice. While recognizing the importance of personal autonomy, using evidence from Ireland, this article explores how a discourse on choice can contribute to inequalities in palliative care because it fails to take account of pre-existing structural inequalities, human relationality, and bodily decline. This article proposes a relational approach to care that takes account not only of the relational lives in those in need of care but also of their careers.
Introduction
Palliative care is an important public health issue. It is concerned with the suffering, the dignity, the care needs and the quality of life of people at the end of their lives. It is also concerned with the care and support of those who care for them, their families, friends, and paid caregivers. Some have argued that in recent decades there has been an increased medicalization and professionalization of palliative care practice (Biswas 1993; Clark 2002;  McNamara 2004; Mills, Rosenberg, and McInerney 2014) . It is in this context that the intertwining ideas of self-determination and well-being have received much support in western bioethics (Ho 2008) , and we have seen the prioritization of choice and autonomy as key quality indicators in Irish palliative care services (Irish Hospice Foundation 2014) . Choice and autonomy have been used to reject medical paternalism and to justify patients' rights to give informed consent (or refusal) and execute advance directives (Ho 2008) . A clear illustration of this in Ireland 1 is the promotion of the notion of patient choice, especially in relation to the place of care and death. The overriding assumption is that people will choose to be cared for and to die at home. The principle of autonomy is exercised and supported through choice of location at time of death. While there is nothing inherently problematic with the idea of choice (it is a very important principle which warrants respect) or the idea of a home death, the problem arises when we assume that people who can fully exercise choice are the norm (Kittay 1999) , including in palliative care.
People in palliative care are not isolated individuals making rational choices simply in their own interests. They are relational beings, engaged in death as in life in a set of care relationships (both positive and negative) and "are often concerned for other family members as much as for themselves" (Borgstrom and Walter 2015, 100) even at the end of life. Operating solely from a choice logic negates the interdependencies (Kittay 1997) in care relations and assumes that all patients are independent and autonomous, even at moments of high vulnerability; there is a danger that those in end-of-life care are framed as abstracted rational choosers, ignoring that they are relational, emotional, and embodied human beings. Choice logic may also lead to the prioritization of performance and control over compassion and care (Campling 2015) , failing in the process to fully acknowledge the reality of bodily decline and the needs of caregivers.
Choice logic is also problematic because it ignores the way economic, power and affective relations and resources, and cultural values mediate "choice" (Baker Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh 2004) . In death as in life, people are structurally located in terms of their social class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, and age. Their relationality within family, friends, neighbors, and community also and private for-profit providers' reports were also examined.
Palliative Care Services in Ireland: the Rise of Commercialization
Ireland is now ranked number four worldwide in the overall score in the Quality of Death Index, which takes into account the basic end-of-life healthcare envi- In 2001, Ireland became one of the first countries in the world to publish a national policy on palliative care. The National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care (NACPC) report provided a comprehensive overview of the investment and requirements for developing palliative care and hospice services over a five to seven year timeframe, and their recommendations were subsequently adopted as government policy for the development of palliative care services (May et al. 2014 , Murray 2005 . As assisted suicide is illegal in Ireland, 2 choice within the NACPC policy promotes the right of patients to choose where they wish to be cared for, the type of spiritual advisor they want, and where they wish to die. They cannot choose when they wish to die.
In essence, palliative care is primarily concerned with quality of life;
it is dedicated to a form of active treatment that is designed to ensure When given a choice of selecting up to three things they would consider most important about the care available to them if they were dying or in the last stages of a terminal illness, the majority of respondents chose "to be surrounded by people I love," followed by "to be free from pain." (Weafer and Associates 2004, 23) home to hospital death (Thomas, Morris, and Clark 2004; Townsend et al. 1990 ). Also, it has been suggested that when hospices are brought into the equation, the perspective may also change. A home-care death may not always be a positive judgment based on the "intrinsic" qualities of a home environment. The decision may be driven by negative impressions of other care environments (Gomes and Higginson 2004) . Moreover, a substantial number of people do not specify a preference for where they will die (van der Heide, de Vogel-Voogt, Visser, van der Rijt, and van der Maas 2007), and there is rarely an option for "it depends" or "does not matter" in surveys about choice of location (Stajduhar, Allan, Cohen, and Heyland 2008) . Furthermore, when three fundamental outcomes of a good death are examined: pain, peace, and grief, findings were inconsistent in terms of home being the best place to die both for the patient and his or her relatives (Escobar Pinzón et al. 2011 , Parkes 1978 , Wright et al. 2010 .
The move toward a conceptualization of a "good death" as a home death occurred in Ireland within a wider context of declining religious influence in public policy and increased privatization and decentralization.
The desire for a home death is not simply driven, therefore, by the cultural preferences of Irish people about their end-of-life care; it is also consistent with an international move to reduce hospital stays, increase community support on the grounds of reducing hospital-acquired infection, and reduce health-care costs.
Since 2006 . Given the commercial interests now dominating much of the discourse and practice relating to home care and home deaths, the ideology of "choice" needs to be more critically examined.
Relationality in Palliative Care Relationships
Multiple meanings of care have developed over the past decades, particularly within feminist writing, with distinctions drawn between caring about and caring for, between care as work and care as emotion, and care as practice and care as disposition (Tronto 1993 , Lloyd, 2012 . In cultures that value independence and individual autonomy, care has become a highly contentious issue for policy and practice. The disabled people's movement has challenged the very idea of care because of its connotations of dependence and lack of autonomy (Lloyd 2012) .
While such contestation is understandable, given the patronizing attitudes and practices that have often underpinned the care of people with disabilities, all humans experience dependency at some time in life. There are inevitable dependencies, arising from the need for care at various stages of life, as a consequence of infancy, illness, impairment, or other vulnerabilities (Lynch, Baker, and Lyons 2009, 1) . Dependency is endemic to the human condition (Kittay 1999) ; it is not an attribute of particular categories of people who can then be objectivized and stigmatized as unproductive. Our reverence for independence takes no account of the reality that sooner or later, independence will become impossible. Serious illness or infirmity will strike (Gawande 2014, 20) .
Moreover, care is necessary work, including the work of caring for oneself, and it is work that is also undertaken by people with disabilities (Barnes 2012) . But care is not the kind of work that is easily measured. It cannot be packaged and delivered in a neat preplanned way, not least because it operates through a different rationality and temporal logic to the "profit-oriented rationality of the market economy" (Bryson 2014, 119) . It has no clear boundaries and therefore cannot be done in the "measurable" time that commodification requires (Folbre 2004 ). Yet in the commercialized home care market, the services the agency contracts to deliver are often reduced to a tick list of basic "physical tasks" such as bathing or showering, washing and dressing, toileting and incontinence (PA Consulting and IPHCA 2009, 35) ; the manner in which these acts are undertaken is not accounted for (Borgstrom and Walter, 2015) .
Dressing someone is easier than letting them dress themselves. It takes less time, there is no negotiation. The tasks come to matter more than the people (Gawande 2014) . "Engagement"-the attempt to understand the other's situation, perspective, and vulnerability (Bergum, 2004) -"fall outside the contract; kindness and compassion are not contracted for" (Borgstrom and Walter 2015, 103) . In a study undertaken in Ireland (Timonen and Doyle 2007) home care staff complained that there was no time allocated for companionship or compassion. And yet, many caregivers (often unpaid) find time to be compassionate, to sit and engage with "the service user," although this "task" is not contractually recognized nor financially rewarded (Sharon, Bolton, and
Wibberley 2014, England and Dyck 2011).
Affective resources, in the form of emotional supports, attentiveness, consideration, listening and time for caring, are essential for having a good death at home because the good death cannot be achieved in isolation. It is a highly emotional, physical, and for many depending on their beliefs, a spiritual experience. Whether care is undertaken through primary or secondary care relations, paid or unpaid, the deployment of affective relational resources is essential (Lynch 2007) .
Those needing end-of-life care are not isolated individuals making rational choices in their own interests, they are social beings inextricably woven together in networks of relationships. Relatives' preferences are an important consideration for patients who wish to die at home (Gomes, Calanzani, Koffman, and Higginson 2015) . There is evidence that patients and their family caregiver agreed only about half the time on where the patient should die (Stajduhar et al. 2008) , not least because of the emotional, social, nursing, and related demands that are placed on family or loved ones when dying at home.
The relationality that underpins the care relationship between primary caregivers and those in need of end-of-life care is not confined to the emotional relationship between them. Whether home caregivers are paid or unpaid, there is an economic relationship involved. Unpaid family caregivers often have to forego employment in whole or in part (take care leave from work where this is allowed
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) and in so doing suffer a significant financial or career loss (Lynch and Lyons 2008) . As it is women who are most likely to be unpaid home caregivers and paid caregivers (Timonen and Doyle 2007, Bolton 2009 ), the gendered relationality of compassion and care needs to be recognized, not least due to its financial cost for those involved in longer term end-of-life care.
Care work is not only gendered it is also classed, and increasingly racialized In framing the issue of relationality in terms of end-of-life care and palliative care, it is important to recognize the relationality not only of those in need of care (particularly in how their choices are contextualized and constrained by their family and economic relations), but also of their caregivers.
Both paid and unpaid caregivers are disproportionately women, and in the case of paid caregivers in the private sector in particular, many are immigrants whose pay and working conditions are in need of both investigation and regulation (Migrant Rights Centre, 2015). The care needs and lives of caregivers need to be part of the intellectual frame when writing of compassionate end-of-life care.
Conceptualizing Choice
Western bioethics has been influenced by the development of the concepts of the individual self and autonomy and there is a general acceptance of the ideals of independence and control (Ho 2008) . Patients are considered separate from others by boundaries that can be justifiably breached only by the explicit and voluntary consent of self-determining subjects (Donchin 2000, 188) . It is in this cultural context that personal autonomy, operationalized as informed choice, has grown to dominate western medical ethics over the last forty years (Beauchamp and Childress 1994 , George and Harlow 2011 , Ho 2008 . Cross-cultural comparisons suggest that, in societies where relationships are not governed by capitalist and industrial modes of production, persons, bodies, and bodily processes may be constructed, conceived, and evaluated in quite different ways (Lawton 2000 , Strathern 1988 . Some people may not have a strong need for control, for example, they may be religious and content to leave their death in the hands of God (NCAOP et al. 2008) .
"Let nature take its course" is an acceptable attitude for Chinese people with regard to the timing of death (Chan, Lam, and Chun 1998; Lo et al. 2002) and some older Irish Catholic people may have a similar way of accepting and assigning meaning to their death (Donnelly 2005) .
It is within a Western context of a logic of choice (Mol 2008 ) that citizens are required to be self-ruling, making informed choices about health and education. However, many people do not wish to choose which school for their child or which hospital to attend for a procedure; they merely want their local school or hospital to be really good (Wallace and Taylor-Gooby 2010) . In other words, people desire high standards and equal access but not necessarily choice (Borgstrom and Walter 2015) .
Choice can become a burden, not least as information is always incomplete, and weighing pros and cons is not an exact science. This is an issue in healthcare, more so than in other areas, as patients lack the knowledge or expertise to accurately assess the benefits from medical care and doctors know more than patients (Greener 2008) . Furthermore, patients often lack both the knowledge and the legal authority to choose their own care, not only with respect to prescription pharmaceutical medicines and surgical interventions, but also in relation to other aspects of care (Tussing and Wren 2006, 89) . Whether a person wishes to die at home may well depend in part on the quality of the alternatives, but few citizens have, or indeed can have, accurate knowledge of the quality of EOLC in the various local hospitals and care homes, especially-in the case of advance directives-months or years in advance (Borgstrom and Walter 2015, 101) .
Choice in Practice
The principle of autonomy was neglected in terminal care before the development of hospice and palliative care-most patients were ill-informed of their situation, and they were submissive to medical paternalism (Hunt 1994, 131) .
So, while choice matters, we argue that it is important to examine choice in terms of its constraints. The enactment of a choice depends on many things, such as the person's social position and body decline, and human relationality.
Choices also have moral implications, in terms of who is assigned to care and how their needs as caregivers are addressed. Whether the caregiver has sufficient time to rest to look after their own care needs matters, as does the remuneration or financial support that they receive for doing caring. The relationality of caregivers (whether they have families other than the person in end-of-life care for whom they have care responsibilities, for example) is also (Zimmermann 2012) . In the case of Irish Travellers, for example, there is considerable evidence that they do not wish to die at home for a variety of cultural and resource reasons.
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The possibility of dying at home is linked to economic resources (Irish Hospice Foundation 2014) and, as is true internationally, the option to die at home is related to a person's level of education, social class (Gisquet, Julliard, and Geoffroy-Perez 2015; Higginson, Jarman, Astin, and Dolan 1999;
Higginson, Sarmento, Calanzani, Benalia, and Gomes 2013) and ethnicity (Coupland, Madden, Jack, Møller, and Davies 2011) . Upper class people die at home more often because they have more resources to engage in planning their deaths and because they are more willing to discuss their preferences with physicians because their cultural resources and backgrounds are generally closer to those of their doctors (Boltanski 1975 , Cohen et al. 2006 , Gisquet et al. 2015 . Thus, when addressing the relationality of those in end-of-life care, it is necessary to examine their class relations, their ethnic relations, and their affective relations in terms of family, friends, and intimate others.
Palliative care is a relational matter, for both those in care and for those who do the caring.
There is a very real risk that by introducing a market logic and making choice the most important factor in end-of-life care, we are opened to promoting a privatized for-profit palliative care. What most people need at times of illness and death is good quality care. Choice becomes incidental if quality of care is assured regardless of location. Moreover, compassion in care is undermined by the commodification of body work and the neglect of an ethic of care (Bergum 2004 , Tronto 2013 .
Constraints on Choice: Body Decline and Autonomy
Palliative care is originally associated with cancer diagnosis, and it is in this context that the concept of good death originated (Gott, Small, Barnes, Payne, and Seamark 2008) . While the likelihood of developing cancer increases in old age and many elderly people live, knowingly or unknowingly, with cancer along with multiple co-morbidities, most of those dying specifically of cancer are not the very old (Borgstrom and Walter 2015) . They are less likely, therefore, to have multiple co-morbidities and cognitive impairments that may reduce agency (Borgstrom and Walter 2015, 100-101) . Younger patients are more likely to have a stronger social network (affective resources) from which representatives can be recruited to help with making and enacting choices (Eika 2009 ).
Furthermore, cancer has a reasonably predictable "illness trajectory" (Murray, Kendall, Boyd, and Sheikh 2005) , which can allow for conversations to take place as patients approach their end. Nonetheless, even cancer patients can be constrained in their choices, or the choices they are encouraged to make, may go against their cultural and social values. In recent research on advance care planning for cancer patients from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in the UK, Horne, Payne, and Seymour (2016) reported that these patients did not necessarily want to discuss advance care planning with their doctors.
Instead they wanted a strong relationship with a physician or oncologist who they could trust and who could make care decisions on their behalf.
On the other hand, many elderly patients, particularly women, have survived spouses, friends, and relatives, sometimes including their own child, which in turn increases their dependency (Eika 2009) This article argues that in framing what is best care at the end of life, we need to think holistically, structurally, and relationally. While respecting patient autonomy and underlining the primacy of compassionate care, it is also crucial to consider the relationality of the person in terms of their family, friends, and community, and in terms of their structural location in social class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and age terms. And it is vital to consider the relationality of caregivers. Care and compassion need to be prioritized, not only for the person who is in care, but for the caregivers, most of whom, paid or unpaid, are women.
Conclusion
The concept of individual control, through the exercising of choice, is fundamental to the market ideology that has been normalized in palliative care thinking in many Anglophone countries in recent years (Borgstrom and Walter 2015) . Grounded in a system of beliefs that glorifies independence and denigrates dependency (Kittay 1997) , it assumes that the idealized patient is autonomous and in control over their bodies at the end of life. It promotes an idealized view of the "good death" as one in which the person exercises choice over the dying process (Lolich and Lynch 2016) . This article argues that when discourses in palliative care prioritize choice they tend to sideline compassion and quality of care; they also deny the relational reality of life for those in care and for caregivers. Furthermore, focusing too much on choice peripheralizes key concerns regarding how the body declines, and how structural constraints and social inequalities impact decision making at the end of life. It also disregards the needs of caregivers, most of whom, whether paid or unpaid, are women, and many of whom are migrant workers.
The dominant narrative in Ireland that a good death is one where you "die in your own bed" is in need of serious re-consideration: it wrongly assumes that all families have the resources and affective capacity to care for a person at the end of life at home. Moreover, many palliative patients do not have the necessary information, economic resources, or affective supports to make informed choices as to where they wish to die. When the choice "to die at home" is idealized, it also leaves unspoken the highly gendered and racialized assumptions as to who will do palliative care work at home and at what price.
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1. Ireland refers to the Republic of Ireland in this article. 2. Assisted suicide is a controversial issue in Ireland as in many countries. The prohibition on assisted suicide has been the subject of a number of high profile legal challenges to the Supreme Court. The Marie Fleming case in 2013 is the most significant one, and the right of her partner to assist her suicide was rejected by the Supreme Court. 3. The construction of a "good death" has always been a fundamental goal in hospice/ palliative care (Clark 2002; McNamara 2001) . In recent decades there has been a transformation of the original meaning of palliative care, marked by an increased medicalization and secularization of death and loss (Bradshaw 1996) . It is not surprising therefore that many have questioned what constitutes a "good death" in a world that for many is post-religious and medicalized (Clark 2003; McNamara 2004) . 4. A sample of 1,000 adults, aged 15+ years, was interviewed from various locations throughout the Republic of Ireland. 5. The maximum Carer's Allowance for full-time caregivers (subject to a means test) is ¤10,600 which is well below the poverty line. 
